

Homotopy Type Theory and the Future of Mathematics

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Introduction

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Set Theory vs Type Theory

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The typing "relation" isn't a proposition. A mathematical object is *always* associated with its type, by its very nature.

Dependent Function Types

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This can be generalized to allow the type of the codomain to *depend* on an element of the domain. For example, the type of “identity matrix” (with entries from \mathbb{R}) is

$$I : (n : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow M_{n \times n}(\mathbb{R}) \quad \left(I : \prod_{n:\mathbb{N}} M_{n \times n}(\mathbb{R}) \right).$$

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This yields such believable results as $I_3 : M_{3 \times 3}(\mathbb{R})$.

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This can be generalized to a dependent pair type. For example, to represent arbitrary tuples of rational numbers:

$$\left(3, \left(\frac{1}{69}, -\frac{1}{420}, 666\right)\right) : (n : \mathbb{N}) \times \mathbb{Q}^n \quad \left((0, ()) : \sum_{n:\mathbb{N}} \mathbb{Q}^n\right).$$

Universe Types

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It is a bad idea to set up a type theory where $\text{Type} : \text{Type}$, due to the type-theoretic version of Russell's paradox (Girard's paradox).

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- Universal quantification is the dependent function type: $(x : A) \rightarrow P(x)$.
- Disjunction and existential quantification are best discussed after *propositional truncation* has been introduced.

Equality

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The identity type is also called the path type; the homotopical intuition is that the terms of $a =_{A} b$ are like paths from a to b in the space A .

Using Equality

Equality can be proved to be symmetric and transitive: for any type A ,

$$\text{sym} : (a\ b : A) \rightarrow a = b \rightarrow b = a,$$

$$\text{trans} : (a\ b\ c : A) \rightarrow a = b \rightarrow b = c \rightarrow a = c.$$

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Some other useful operations: for any types A, B ,

$$\text{ap} : (f : A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (x\ y : A) \rightarrow x = y \rightarrow f(x) = f(y),$$

$$\text{transport} : A = B \rightarrow A \rightarrow B.$$

Inductive Types

Where do types like \mathbb{N} come from? They are “freely generated” from “constructors”. The “inductive definition” of \mathbb{N} is

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Every natural number has a “canonical form”, like $2 \equiv S(S(0))$.

Despite the high quotation mark-density, this can be made precise; the validity of similar inductive definitions can be checked by a mechanical process.

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Explicitly, this elimination principle can be expressed in type theory itself as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{N}\text{-elim} : & (P : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{Type}) \rightarrow P(0) \rightarrow ((n : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow P(n) \rightarrow P(S(n))) \\ & \rightarrow (n : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow P(n). \end{aligned}$$

Elimination Examples

Here is a definition by *pattern matching* (equivalent to eliminator use) of $+$ on \mathbb{N} :

$$+ : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N};$$

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Here is an inductive proof that $+$ is associative:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{+-is-assoc} &: (a\ b\ c : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c; \\ \text{+-is-assoc } a\ b\ 0 &:= \text{refl}(a + b); \\ \text{+-is-assoc } a\ b\ S(c) &:= \text{ap}_S(\text{+-is-assoc } a\ b\ c). \end{aligned}$$

Other Inductive Types

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In HoTT, *higher* inductive types can be defined, which can include path constructors as well as the point constructors that we have seen so far.

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- Playing with a proof assistant is the best way to understand the previous content on an intuitive level.
- Ensures that you don't make mistakes when things get complicated.
- Turns mathematics into a fun computer game.

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Being a 0 -type (a type with h-level 0) means being contractible, which is expressed as:

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Rest assured that the identity type of a contractible type is itself contractible.

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Being a *proposition* means being a 1-type (having “at most one” term/proof):

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Being a *set* means being a 2-type (its identity type is a proposition)

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More H-Levels

Being a *proposition* means being a 1-type (having “at most one” term/proof):

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The types $\mathbb{0}$ and $\mathbb{1}$ are both propositions.

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It can be proven (with some effort) that \mathbb{N} is a set (this follows by Hedberg’s Theorem).

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This is actually different from the naïve translation of “is bijective” (since there might be different *proofs* that $f(x) = y$). We can define the type of all equivalences between two types:

$$A \simeq B := (f : A \rightarrow B) \times \text{is-equiv}(f),$$

which is a “nice” definition since $\text{is-equiv}(f)$ is always a proposition.

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- Isomorphic groups are equal (don't confuse *groups* with *subgroups*).

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It's already used informally, for convenience. If G and H are isomorphic groups, and G is squanchy, then you can bet that H is squanchy. HoTT provides a rigorous justification for this.

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By characterizing the identity type, univalence lets us prove that $\text{Set} := (A : \text{Type}) \times \text{is-set}(A)$ is a 3-type (i.e., its identity types are sets). Given sets A, B , the type $A = B$ is equivalent (and hence equal!) to the *set* of bijections from A to B .

Higher Inductive Types

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Intuitively, to define a function out of $\|A\|$, you may use a term of A , provided that the value you are defining does not depend on which term you select (for example, the codomain type could be a proposition).

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The axiom of choice: for any *set* A and any family of *sets* $B : A \rightarrow \text{Type}$, we have

$$((x : A) \rightarrow \|B(x)\|) \rightarrow \|(x : A) \rightarrow B(x)\|.$$

More HITs

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Defined by

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 $(\text{base} = \text{base}) = \mathbb{Z}$.

Cubical Type Theory

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Talk to me about this later...

The Future of Mathematics

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- Spoilers are bad!

Further Reading

- The HoTT Book:
<https://homotopytypetheory.org/book/>
- The 1lab:
<https://1lab.dev/>
- The HoTT Game:
<https://thehottgameguide.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html>